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THE TRUST FUND THEORY AND SOME SUBSTI-
TUTES FOR IT.
It was formerly supposed that the relations between a corpora-
tion and its creditors were the same as those which existed between
an individual debtor and his creditor. For example, in the year 1826,
in the case of Catlin v. The Eagle Bank (6 Conn. 233), Chief
Justice Hosmer said:
"Where no legal lien has been obtained, it is a reason-
able supposition that the relation between creditor and
debtor must in all cases infer the same consequences; and
that where the same mischief exists, there is the same law.
The cases of an individual and of a corporation, in the
matter under discussion, it appears to me are not merely
analogous but identical; and I discern no reason for the
slightest difference between them."
Since that time, however, the view has gradually grown up that
the common law rights of a creditor over his debtor's property did
not adequately protect the creditor of a corporation. In order to
give the latter more extensive rights, it was thought that those
rights must be based upon a theory different from that which
ordinarily applies between debtor and creditor.
This new doctrine was for the first time announced in the year
1824 by Judge Story in the well-known case of Wood v. Dummer
(3 Mason 3o9). In that case, the stockholders of a bank without
paying its debts, had divided among themselves all the property of
the corporation. Manifestly, a great injustice had been done to
the creditors and on some theory or other they must be allowed to
recover their claims from the persons who had so received the
property of the corporation. Apparently, Judge Story thought that
none of the principles of law applicable to the ordinary relation of
debtor and creditor were adequate to the situation. The stock-
holders did not owe the debt and how, therefore, colid the creditor
compel them to pay? If, however, the property of the company
be regarded as a fund held by the corporation in trust for its cred-
itors, then the difficulty was overcome, for trust property could be
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followed into the hands of persons who have notice of the trust.
As Judge Story said:
"If I am right in this position, the principle difficulty in
the cause is overcome. If the capital stock is a trust fund,
then it may be followed into the hands of any persons
having notice of the trust attaching to it."
As this new theory was so convenient to the solution of this
case, Judge Story proceeded to show that the property of a cor-
poration was a fund held in trust by it for its creditors. He says:
"It appears to me very clear upon general principles as
well as the Legislative intention, that the capital stock is
to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for payment of debts
contracted by the bank. The public as well as the Legis-
lature have always supposed this to be a fund appropriated
for such a purpose. The individual stockholders are not
liable for the debts of the bank in their private capacities.
The charter relieves them from personal responsibility and
substitutes the capital stock in its stead. Credit is uni-
versally given to this fund by the public as the only means
of repayment. * * * The stockholders have no rights
until all the other creditors are satisfied. They have the
full benefit of all the profits made by the establishment,
and cannot take any portion of the fund until all the other
claims on it are extinguished."
There would perhaps be little reason to object to calling the
property of a corporation a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors,
if all that the phrase meant was, that a corporation must pay its
debts before dividing its assets among its stockholders.
But the trouble is that the "trust fund theory" thus originated
has not been confined to the case to which Judge Story first applied
it. That could not be expected. The consequences of the theory
as applied to other cases are at once pressed upon the courts. It
is at once argued that if the property of a corporation is a fund
held by it in trust for its creditors, then all the principles of the law
of trusts and trustees apply; and soon the rights of the creditor of
a corporation over his debtor's property become entirely different
and much more extensive than his rights over the property of an
individual.
Hence, it becomes desirable to determine whether property
of a corporation under any circumstances is, in any proper sense of
the term, a trust fund held by it for the benefit of its creditors.
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The reasons advanced by Judge Story and repeated by many
judges since that time furnish perhaps a ground for adopting a
different policy toward a corporation than toward an individual
debtor; but they furnish no ground for applying to corporate prop-
erty the law of trusts and trustees. The facts that the stockholders
are relieved from liability and that creditors look to the property of
a corporation for the payment of their debts are not sufficient to
bring the case within the settled definition of a trust.
A trust implies a trustee holding a legal title and cestui que
trusts who have the beneficial interest. A court of equity will
compel a trustee to hold and manage the property for the sole
benefit of a cestui, to whom alone, in its eyes, the property belongs.
The trustee can make no profit out of the property. His sole
reward is his commission. All the property and all the profits
belong to the cestui que trust.
Manifestly, the property of a corporation is held by it in trust
in no such sense. A corporation has the beneficial or equitable as
well as the legal title. It is in business to make money for itself
and its stockholders and not for its creditors; while a trustee can
only make money for his cestui que trust.
But it may be said that it is not claimed that the property of a
going, solvent corporation is a trust fund for its creditors; it is
only when the corporation becomes insolvent and ceases to do busi-
ness that the assets become a trust fund. Many cases may be found
where it is so stated. For example, in the case of Appleton v.
Turnbull (84 Me. 72), the court said:
"It is too firmly established at the present day to be
questioned, that the capital stock of a corporation is a trust
fund for the payment of its debts * * "* during the
existence of the life of the corporation, it is a trust to be
managed for the benefit of its stockholders, but in the event
of a dissolution or of insolvency, it becomes a trust fund for
the benefit of its creditors."
This doctrine is equally objectionable with the doctrine first
stated. The assets of an insolvent corporation which has ceased
to do business are in no proper sense held by the corporation in
trust for its creditors.
It is true, undoubtedly, that the creditors are entitled to have all
the property applied to the payment of debts. The samne, however,
is true of an insolvent individual. But the fact of insolvency does
not make either the property of an individual or that of a corporation
a trust fund for creditors. Creditors may levy executions on such
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property, but they have no equitable title to it. The fact of in-
solvency alone does not give a court of equity jurisdiction to manage
and administer the property as a trust estate. The mere insolvency
of a corporation even coupled with cessation of business has never
been considered as ground for the appointment of a receiver on the
application of a creditor, unless so provided by statute. Nor can
this case be brought within any of the classes of trusts which courts
of equity are accustomed to enforce.
In short, whether before or after insolvency, a corporation has
the entire title, both legal and equitable. There is no principle of
law which will vest an equitable title in one where there was none
before, because of the single fact of insolvency.
No extended argument seems necessary to prove that this is a
correct statement of the law. Such an argument may be found,
however, in the case of O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer (iO6 Ala. 205),
where in the course of an opinion, in which the trust fund theory is
repudiated, the nature of a trust and the modes in which one may
come into existence are fully considered and the conclusion reached
that the property of a corporation is not held by it in trust for
creditors.
Not only has this conclusion been reached in jurisdictions which
have repudiated the theory, but other courts which at times have
strongly insisted upon the doctrine, have refused to accept its conse-
quences. While insisting on the name, they have in effect held that
corporate property was not trust property. The decisions of the
United States Court, in which the doctrine originated, well illustrate
this.
In Sawyer v. Hoag (17 Wall. 61o) and Upton v. Tribilcock (91
U. S. 45), and in -other cases, the Supreme Court seemed .to have
fully adopted the new principle announced in Wood v. Dummer
(supra). The property of a corporation was to be regarded as trust
property, certainly so in the event of insolvency. At a time when it
seemed that this must be considered as too firmly established to be
overthrown, the case of Graham v. R. Co. (102 U. S. 148) came
before that court.
That was a suit by a subsequent creditor, who had obtained a
judgment, to reach property which had been conveyed by the cor-
poration to its directors. It was contended that:
"A corporation debtor does not stand on the same
footing as an individual debtor; that, whilst the latter has
supreme dominion over his own property, a corporation is
a mere trustee, holding its property for the benefit of its
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stockholders and creditors; and that if it fail to pursue
its rights against third persons, whether arising out of
fraud or otherwise, it is a breach of trust, and creditors
may come into equity to compel an enforcement of the
corporate duty."
In Wabash etc. R. Co. v. Ham (114 U. S. 587), a similar case,
four corporations had been consolidated and their property conveyed
to a new corporation, which had subsequently mortgaged it. The
plaintiff was an unsecured. contract creditor of one of the old com-
panies and sued to have his debt declared a lien on the property of
the new company, superior to the mortgage. It was contended that
the property of the old corporation was a trust fund for creditors
and therefore the plaintiff had an equitable lien upon it.
If the property of a corporation is to be considered a trust fund
for creditors as the Supreme Court had repeatedly declared, then it
would seem that both these cases should have been decided in favor
of the plaintiff. Indeed the same court had said in Sawyer v. Uprot
(91 U. S. 56) that "the creditors have a lien upon it (the corporate
property) in equity."
In each of the above cases, however, the court refused to accept
the consequences of the doctrine which it had in the beginning so
-eagerly welcomed.
In the Graham case, the court said:
"A corporation is a distinct entity. Its affairs are
necessarily managed by officers and agents, it is true; but,
it is as distinct a being as an individual is, and is entitled
to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as abso-
lutely as an individual can hold it. Its estate is the same,
its interest is the same, its possession is the same."
And in the Wabash R. R. Co. case, the court held that all that
the trust fund doctrine meant was that when a corporation becomes
insolvent "all its creditors are entitled in equity to have their debts
paid out of the corporate property before any distribution is made
among stockholders."
To the same effect see Fogg v. Blair (33 U. S. 534).
Thus the court, while still insisting on the name, in effect, says
that there is in such a case no trust; for manifestly, a right to have a
debtor's property applied to the payment of debts before being used
for his own purposes does not make the debtor a trustee, or the cred-
itor a cestui que trust.
But it may be said that in the above cases the corporation was
not insolvent and therefore the court was acting within the princi-
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ples which it had previously laid down when it decided that the
principles of the law of trusts were not applicable to the property
of a solvent corporation.
This is perhaps true. But in the subsequent case of Hollins v.
The Brierield Coal & Iron Co. (150 U. S. 371) the same court
refused to apply the law of trusts to the property of an insolvent
corporation. In that case, unsecured contract creditors, without first
reducing their claim to a judgment, filed a bill against a corporation
asking for the appointment of a receiver and the administration of
the corporate property by the court for the benefit of the creditors.
In answer to the objection that only judgment creditors or those
having an express lien were entitled to pursue such a remedy, it
was contended that the corporate assets constituted a trust fund for
creditors and hence a court of equity could administer this for the
benefit of the cestui que trust.
The court said:
"A party may deal with a corporation, in respect to its
property, in the same manner as with an individual owner,
and with no greater danger of being held to have received
into his possession property burdened with a trust or lien.
The officers of a corporation act in a fiduciary capacity in
respect to its property in their hands, and may be called.
to an account for fraud, or, sometimes even mere mis-
management, in respect thereto; but, as between itself and
its creditors, the corporation is simply a debtor, and does
not hold its property in trust, or subject to a lien in their
favor, in any other sense than does an individual debtor."
And again:
"It is rather a trust in the administration of the assets
after possession by a court of equity, than a trust attaching
to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either
creditor or stockholder."
The doctrine of the United States Court is well summed up in:
the recent case of The American Exchange Bank v. Ward (iii Fed.
782), where the court said:
"The -only trust attaching to such property is in the
administration of the assets after possession is taken by a
Court of Equity and is not a trust attaching to the property
as such for the direct benefit of either creditor or stock-
holder."
The Supreme Court, however, still insists 'on using the term
"trust fund," though it has refused to apply the law of trusts to
the property of either an insolvent or solvent corporation.
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See Camden v. Stuart (144 U. S. 1O4).
The reason for this seems to be partly because of reluctance
expressly to overrule some of the earlier cases, where the theory
was vigorously asserted, and partly because the court wishes still to
apply some of the principles of the law of trusts while refusing to
apply others. It still deems the principle of following trust property
which was applied in Wood v. Dummer essential in order to enable
a court of equity to do full justice to creditors of corporations.
But what are the rights of a creditor of a corporation if the trust
fund theory must be abandoned as having no foundation in the law?
This question can be best answered by considering some of the
cases to which the theory has been applied.
The principle cases, perhaps, to which the doctrine has been
applied, are the following:
i. Where the property of a corporation has been divided among
its stockholders without paying creditors.
2. Where an insolvent corporation has preferred a creditor.
3. Where it is sought to recover unpaid or partially paid
subscriptions to capital stock.
i. The first of the cases enumerated, to wit: Where a corpora-
tion has distributed its property among its stockholders without
having first paid its debts, is the case of Wood v Dummer (supra),
in which this doctrine, as has already been stated, was originated.
It is simply a case of a debtor giving away his property so that
nothing is left with which to pay his debts. Such acts, of course,
were long ago forbidden by the law as being conveyances in fraud
of creditors. There is no reason why the ordinary remedies of a
creditor to pursue property fraudulently conveyed should be con-
sidered insufficient. A judgment creditor's bill will lie. If it were
the case of a breach of trust, the cestui que trust could follow the
trust property without first obtaining a judgment against the trustee;
but in the case under consideration, the creditor must first exhaust
his legal remedies against the corporation before pursuing his
equitable remedies against persons who have received its property,
thus standing on exactly the same footing that creditors of individ-
uals do.
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Company (supra).
This seems to be the real ground of the rule that corporate debts
must be paid before any distribution is made among stockholders.
If any further ground for the rule is thought necessary, it may be
found in the analogy to the law of partnership. which requires firm
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debts to be paid out of the assets before individual debts. Moreover,
the rule seems to be a legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the
argument of Judge Story quoted above.
2. In the second case above referred to, the trust fund theory
has been used to prevent a corporation from preferring a creditor
under circumstances where an individual debtor would have the
right to make such a preference. The argument is perfectly logical.
If the property of an insolvent corporation is a trust fund for cred-
itors, if in equity all the property belongs to them in proportion to
their debts, a preference of one of such creditors is a breach of
trust. A portion of the property which one creditor gets by the
payment of his debt in full, belongs in equity to the other creditors.
This is the position taken in Rouse v. Merchants Bank (46 Ohio
St. 493), where the court says:
"It being established that the corporate property is a
trust fund for the benefit of corporate creditors, it follows
that after the insolvency of the company is ascertained and
the objects of its creation are no longer pursued, the
managing board of directors then having the custody of the
property become trustees thereof for the-creditors and this
relation necessarily forbids any discrimination between the
beneficiaries of the distribution or application of the funds."
The common law rule that a debtor in failing circumstances
may prefer any creditor he chooses has often been criticised, but is
as fully established as any principle of the common law. If, as we
have seen, the trust fund theory has no basis in the law of trusts,
then the reason for refusing to allow a corporation to prefer a
creditor necessarily fails. Under the trust fund theory as finally
interpreted by the U. S. Supreme Court, the same conclusions must
follow. If, as stated in Fogg v. Blair, the doctrine only means that
creditors must be paid before any distribution is made among stock-
holders, or if, as stated in the Hollins case, the doctrine means that
the corporate property, when taken possession of by a court of
equity, will be administered as if it were trust property, then the
same conclusion is reached. Neither of these principles furnishes
any ground for refusing to apply the common law rule which allows
debtors to make preferences among their creditors. Indeed, the
Supreme Court so intimated in the case of Smith Purifier Co. v.
McGroarty (136 U. S. 237-24), where it is said that the Ohio
decisions proceed upon "a theory that the property of an insolvent
corporation is a trust fund in a wider and more general sense than
could be maintained upon general principles of equity jurisprudence."
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See also San dford F. & T. Co. v. Howe, ctc., Co. (157 U. S.
312).
The conclusion is that there is no principle of the common law
which prevents an insolvent corporation from making preferences
among creditors, just as an individual may do. If public policy
requires that it should be forbidden, it is a matter for statutory
regulation. Those courts which have acted on the theory of the
Ohio court are guilty of judicial legislation.
Probably in a majority of the states preferences by corporations
are permitted. For example in Pond v. Framingham & Lowell
R. Co. (13o Mass. 194), the Massachusetts courts held that the
rights of the parties were governed by the common law and refused
to enjoin an insolvent corporation from making preferences.
In First National Bank v. Dovetail Co. (143 Ind. 550), the
Indiana courts followed the rule of the Hollins case and held that
an insolvent corporation had the same power as an individual over
its property, until the court by its officers took possession of it,
In Brown v. Grand Rapids Co. (22 L. R. A. 817), the Michigan
courts held that the assets of an insolvent corporation were not trust
funds for equal distribution among creditors.
So also the Missouri courts in Schufeldt v. Smith (29 L. R. A.
83o), decided that no argument against preferences could be based
on the trust fund theory, as that theory "while dominion over its
property is retained is not recognized as being sound."
In Connecticut, Judge Hosmer in the early case of Catlin v.
Eagle Bank, already cited, reached the same conclusion. That case
is especially interesting because in it that eminent judge repudiated
the trust fund theory within two years after Wood v. Dummer had
been decided. The reasoning of that case is in no degree shaken
by the subsequent decision in Crandal v. Lincoln (52 Conn. 73), in
which the court said with reference to the Catlin case:
"We cannot believe that the court intended to establish
a rule which should be contrary to the overwhelming cur-
rent of authorities in nearly every other jurisdiction."
The absurdity of this statement becomes manifest when it is
remembered that W'ood v. Duimner was at the time when Judge
Hosmer wrote probably the only decision sustaining the trust fund
theory. If .!e Catlin case is contrary to the "current of authority,"
it is because since that time some jurisdictions have chosen to follow
new gods instead of worshipping at the shrine of the old ones.
These courts in refusing to accept a logical consequence of the
trust fund theory, repudiate it.
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3. The trust fund theory has been, perhaps, most -often applied
to the case where a creditor of an insolvent corporation seeks to
compel a stockholder to pay a balance claimed to be due on stock
for which the par value has never been paid to the corporation.
Cases where creditors seek to recover a balance claimed to be
due on stock may be considered in two classes.
(a) Cases where the stockholder has subscribed for the stock
at par.
(b) Cases where the corporation has issued stock as full paid,
under an agreement with the stockholder that he shall pay nothing
or less than par.
The first class presents no difficulty. The application of ancient
and familiar principles of law enables creditors to recover such
subscriptions.
The contract of a subscriber to stock as construed in most juris-
dictions is to pay the par value when called upon by the company
and if the company becomes insolvent, to pay any balance up to the
par-value if needed to pay creditors.
Scoville v. Thayer (105 U. S. 143); Fish v. Smith (73 Conn.
377).
If such a claim has become fully matured by a call on the part of
the directors, a creditor of the corporation may garnishee the
stockholder or pursue any other remedy just as if his debtor were
an individual. If the directors have made no call, probably such
subscription could not be collected by the creditor in a suit at law,
but it could be reached through the aid of a court of equity and a
receiver. In either case there is no occasion for the application of
any principle different from that which is ordinarily applied between
debtor and creditor, or in other words, there is no occasion for
applying the trust fund theory.
The courts have often strained the facts in order to bring cases
within this class. It is often said, as for example in Upton v. Tribil-
cock (91 U. S. 45), that "a promise to take shares of stock imports
a promise to pay for them." This is undoubtedly a fair inference of
fact drawn from the fact of subscription and customs of business.
But where there is an express agreement by which the exact amount
to be paid is fixed, there would seem to be no room for such in-
ference. For instance, in the above case, there was clearly a definite
understanding between the agent of the corporation and the stock-
holder that only 2o per cent. of the par value should be paid. It
was therefore impossible to infer from the taking of the stock an
agreement to pay par for it. On the facts no court would have
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allowed the corporation itself to recover from the stockholder beyond
the 2o per cent. The court has made a bargain for the parties
instead of enforcing their contract as made by them.
Nevertheless, that case and others like it, if the facts can bear
the construction put upon them, did not require the application of
the trust fund theory, for they fall in the class now under con-
sideration.
The second class mentioned above presents a more difficult ques-
tion. There it is admitted that the stockholder never agreed to pay
the balance which it sought to recover from him and that the cor-
poration itself could not have recovered it, because the stock was
issued as a gift or under an express agreement to pay a sum less
than par. Scoville v. Thayer (05 U. S. 143) was such a case, the
first of the kind which arose in the Supreme Court. It was said:
"The stock held by the defendant was evidenced by a
certificate of full paid shares. It is conceded to have been
the contract between him and the company that he should
never be called upon to pay any further amounts upon it.
As between him and the company, this was a perfectly
valid agreement. * * * No suit could have been main-
tained by the company to collect the unpaid stock. The
shares were issued as full paid on a fair understanding
and that bound the company."
The question then arises whether there is any principle of law
which will allow creditors of the company to recover in such a case
though the corporation could not.
The answer given to this question by the trust fund theory is
that the stockholder should pay because he has received trust
property.
]n the first place, it should be noticed that in order to apply the
theory of trusts to this case, it must be held that the stock of a
corporation is a trust fund whether the corporation is solvent or
insolvent, for in most cases, the act which is claimcd to be a breach
of trust, to wit: issuing stock at less than par or as a bonus, was
done while the company was a solvent going concern. Some of
the cases go to this extent. For example: In Union .Vational Bank
v. Douglass (I McCrary 86), the court said:
"The truth is that it makes no difference whatever
whether a corior,s )n is solvent or insolvent, so far as
the doctrine is conceinod, that tlbe Prlwrty ia a trwst fund
which cannot bL w ithdrawn or aplrpriated b\ tfl. :tock-
holders until the debt is paid."
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This is in direct conflict with the very many cases where it is
said that the property is a trust fund only when the company be-
comes insolvent. In the present case, in order to make the theory
apply, it is necessary to call the property of a solvent corporation
trust property. In those cases, in order to relieve the court of the
consequences of calling such property trust property, the court has
denied that it was such until the corporation became insolvent. Such
is the inconsistency to which the doctrine leads.
In the next place, it may be inquired, what trust property has the
stockholder received for which he is accountable to a creditor? If
we suppose that a corporation, newly organized, and without prop-
erty, issues to certain persons all its stock, there is certainly no
ground at that point of time for saying that such persons have re-
ceived any property, trust or otherwisg of the corporation. The cor-
poration had nothing. The stock -% ssarily be worthless.
Or suppose that an existing corporation. avinz stockhold-
ers, issues additional stock to outside part .eration.
Has not the corporation just as much property , and has
any existing creditor any reason to complain? U. . ly, in such a
case, the situation of the creditor is in no wise changed. It is the
former stockholders who are injured. This has been repeatedly
noticed in the cases.
See Flinn v. Bagley, 7 Fed. 841; Coit v. Gold Antalgamat-
ing Co., 119 U. S. 343.
In fact, as stated in Flinn v. Bagley, if anything at all was paid
for the stock, existing creditors instead of being injured are better
off than before.
The fact is that unissued stock is in no sense property of the cor-
poration and cannot therefore constitute a trust fund. Until issued
it is a mere possibility, like a contract while negotiations are still in
progress. The corporation has the power to issue stock but has not
yet done so. If stock is issued without consideration, the corpora-
tion has parted with no property. It has neither more nor less than
before. The ownership of the corporation merely has been subdi-
vided. Partners may take in an additional partner and give him an
interest in the firm assets without consideration. Such action
would, however, not decrease the property of the firm, but would
affect the division of the profits. So in the case of a corporation,
the issue of bonus stock affects the amount of dividends which each
stockholder may receive and not the amount of the property of the
corporation. If any injury is done. therefore, it is to non-consent-
ing stockholders and not to existing creditors.
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The necessary conclusion is that a stockholder cannot be made to
respond to creditors on the ground that he has received property
which constituted a trust fund for their benefit, for he has received
no property of the corporation.
It is true that the stock issued without consideration may be of
great value to the holder, but it is not because he has received any
property of the corporation, but because the original stockholders
have permitted him to gain a right to a share in profits and manage-
ment which they might have kept themselves or compelled the
person acquiring it to pay for. Creditors could in no way have real-
ized upon the unissued stock. Why should they have greater rights
when it is issued? The property of the corporation is one thing;
the right to manage and participate in profits is another. The one
is owned by the corporation; the other by the stockholders, and can
never be owned by the corporation.
The same line of argument, of course, will apply to future cred-
itors. ., can be no breach of trust as to them because the corpo-
ration ha., . "Jed with no property held by it in trust or otherwise.
Hither,,. :.be question has been considered on the basis that the
ground on which the cases which hold that stockholders may be
compelled to pay more for their stock than they agreed to pay, rest,
is, that the unissued stock of a corporation is in a strict sense a trust
fund, as the name indicates. But, if the reasons given in some of
the cases for the conclusion, be considered, it will be seen that this
theory is not the real ground of the decision. For example, in Sco-
ville v. Thayer (supra) the court said:
"The reason is that the stock subscribed is considered in
equity as a trust fund for the payment of creditors. It
is so held out to the public who have no means of knowing
the private contracts made between the corporation and its
stockholders. The creditor has the right, therefore, to pre-
sume that the stock subscribed has been or will be paid
up.
The real ground of the decision is that it is held out to the public
that stock issued has been or will be paid up and that persons dealing
with the corporation, who have no means of knowing the private
contracts between the corporation and the stockholder have a right
to rely on the representations.
Regarding this as the real ground on which the court intended
to place the decision, certain conclusions follow. No one except
persons who were so misled could have any claim against a stock-
holder on this ground. Creditors existing at the time when the
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unpaid stock of the corporation was issued as full paid could not
have been misled nor could persons who became creditors subsequent
to that time, if they knew the actual contract under which the stock
was issued.
It was so decided in Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co.
(1i9 U. S. 343) and Handley v. Stutz (i39 U. S. 417). In the lat-
ter case it was held that those only, who had "trusted the company
upon the faith of the increased stock," were entitled to enforce their
claims against the stockholders.
The essential features of the creditors' claim according to these
cases seem to be a holding out on the part of the corporation or stock-
holder that stock issued is either full paid or will be and an exten-
sion of credit to the company on the faith of such representations,
i.e. by a subsequent creditor ignorant of the actual contract on which
the stock was issued.
Now it is apparent that there is nothing in this state of facts
which can be said to constitute the relation of trustee and cestui que
trust between the corporation and its creditor. To call the theory
on which a creditor is allowed to recover in such a case a trust fund
theory is a manifest misnomer.
Such a state of facts calls for the application of the principles
of law relating to fraud or estoppel rather than the principles of
law relating to trusts. For this reason, it seems to be the present
tendency of the courts to abandon the term "trust fund" and to
adopt fraud as the ground for recovery. One of the first cases in
which the decision is put upon that ground is Hospes v. Car Co. (48
Minn. 174) decided in i892. It that case, after pointing out that
creditors cannot recover against a stockholder on the ground of
contract, where the corporation could not, because where there is an
express contract to pay less than par, the court has no power to
infer a contract to pay par, and after referring to the cases which
hold that only creditors who trusted the tompany on the faith of
the unpaid stock can recover against stockholders, the court reaches
the conclusion that the true ground of recovery is fraud.
"The capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit.
It is a substitute for the individual liability to those who
own its stock. People deal with it and give it credit on
the faith of it. They have the right to assume that it
has paid in capital to the amount which it represents itself
as having; and if they give it credit on the faith of
that representation, and if the representation is false, it is
a fraud upon them; and, in case the corporation becomes
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insolvent, the law, upon the plainest principles of common
justice says to the delinquent stockholder, 'Make that
representation good by paying for your stock.' It cer-
tainly cannot require the invention of any new doctrine in
order to enforce so familiar a rule of equity. It is the mis-
representation of fact in stating the amount of capital to be
greater than it really is that is the true basis of the liability
of the stockholder in such cases; and it follows that it is
only those creditors who have relied, or who can fairly be
presumed to have relied, upon the professed amount
of capital, in whose favor the law will recognize and en-
force an equity against the holders of "bonus" stock. This
furnishes a rational and uniform rule, to which familiar
principles are easily applied, and which frees the subject
from many of the difficulties ard apparent inconsistencies
into which the "trust fund" doctrine has involved it; and
we think that, even when the trust-fund doctrine has been
invoked the decision in almost every well-considered case
is readily referable to such rule."
Before proceeding farther, it may be well to note some of the
consequences of putting the cause of action on this basis. One
necessary result is that no person, whose claim is in tort, except the
defrauded creditor, could recover against such a holder of unpaid
stock. His claim did not arise on the faith of the unpaid stock and
could not have done so.
Another consequence of the doctrine is that the creditors claim
is a personal one against the stockholder who has defrauded him.
It would seem that his rights cannot be worked out through the
corporation. If he is defrauded, let him sue directly the man who
is guilty of the fraud.
Another consequence is that such a claim could not be prosecuted
by a receiver of the corporation. It is in no sense the property of
the corporation, which had no claim against the stockholders; nor
would the personal right of a creditor vest in the receiver, although
he, in a sense, is the representative of all the creditors. Even on
the basis of the decisions of the United States courts, it is impossi-
ble to urderstand how a receiver of the corporation can enforce
such a claim, fti each creditor may be differently situated. Only
those creditors who were ignorant and who relied are entitled to
recover against the stockholder. The stockholder, therefore, has
the right to defend against each creditor separately and to show that
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that creditor could not have relied. If the suit is brought by a re-
ceiver of the corporation, this would be difficult, if not impossible.
The question next to be considered is whether an action for fraud
furnishes any sounder basis than the trust fund theory for com-
pelling a stockholder to pay more for his stock than he has agreed
to pay. The question will first be considered on the understanding
that when the courts say a creditor may recover on the ground of
fraud, they are referring to a liability such as arises from fraud at
common law.
One of the essential elements of a common law action for fraud
is a false representation of a material fact. It must be remembered
that the creditor of the corporation is seeking to recover from a
stockholder. It must, therefore, appear that such stockholder has
made the false representation. Now, it may very well be that all
that the stockholder has done is to accept a certificate of full paid
stock under an agreement with the corporation that he should pay
nothing for it. The corporation may have held it out to the world
that it has so much stock out-standing which, the courts say, the
creditor has the right to presume has been or will be paid for in full.
But how can it be said that the stockholder participates in such repre-
sentation? It is not his representation, nor is it made by his agent.
If made at all, it is probably made without his knowledge.
Another of the necessary elements of the action of fraud is that
the defrauded party must have relied on the false representation.
Under ordinary circumstances, as a matter of fact, at the time the
credit was extended to the company, the person so giving credit did
not even know that any particular individual was a stockholder.
How then can he be said to rely on any representation made by him?
The answer given to this question in the case of Hospes v.. Car Co.
(supra), is this:
"Inasmuch as the capital of a corporation is the basis
of its credit, its financial- standing and reputation in the
community has its source in, and is founded upon the
amount of its professed and supposed capital, and everyone
who deals with it does so upon the faith of that standing
and reputation, although, as a matter of fact, he may have
no personal knowledge of the amount of its professed capi-
tal, and in a majority of cases knows nothing about the
shares of stock held by any particular stockholder, or, if
so, what was paid for them. Hence, in a suit by such
creditor against the holders of "bonus" stock, he could
not truthfully allege, and could not affirmatively prove,
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that lie believed that the defendants' stock had been paid
for, and that he gave the corporation credit on the faith
of it, although, as a matter of fact, he actually gave the
credit on the faith of the financial standing of the corpo-
ration, which was based upon its apparent and professed
amount of capital. The misrepresentation as to the
amount of capital would operate as a fraud on such a
creditor as fully and effectually as if he had personal
knowledge of the existence of the defendant's stock, and
believed it to have been paid for when he gave the credit."
The court concludes that all that it is necessary for the plaintiff
to show is that he is a subsequent creditor.
It has always been supposed that the plaintiff must plead and
prove the facts constituting fraud. It is going a great way to say the
least, when the court relieves him from making any proof and
substitutes for it the knowledge of the court as to what gives a cor-
poration a financial standing. Furthermore, the court's statement
as to the source of the financial standing of a corporation may safely
be challenged. A circular lies on the writer's desk saying that a
corporation has outstanding full paid stock amounting to $1,500,000.
Is there any business man who would be influenced to extend credit
to that company on account of that fact alone? On the contrary, if an
appeal be made to common knowledge, as the court has done, it will
be found that the financial standing of a corporation depends upon
the same facts as that of an individual. How much property has it
and how much does it owe? Does it pay its debts promptly? It
is believed that the amount of the capital stock affects the conclusion
slightly, if at all. The court is going on very unsafe ground when
it substitutes its own assumptions as to facts, for proof, as does the
Illinois court in a similar case when it says: "They must have
been influenced by it."
Melvin v. Lamar Ice Co. (8o Ill. 446).
But it may be said that the Hospes case was a suit in equity and
was decided on equitable principles. But what principle of equity
is there which will enable a plaintiff to recover under such circum-
stances? Perhaps it may be supposed that it is to be found in the
statement in the opinion in the case that the stockholder must "Make
that representation good by paying for his stock." There are cer-
tain circumstances under which courts of equity have been accus-
tomed to compel a man to make his representations good. Mr. Pol-
lock in his work on contracts (Pollock on Contracts, p. 497) after
an extended discussion, reaches the conclusion that false representa-
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tions produce legal consequences only when they can be considered
as terms or conditions of a contract or when they operate as an
estoppel, or when they amount to common law fraud, citing Alder-
man v. Maddison (5 Ex. D. 293).
Applying the learned author's conclusions to the case under dis-
cussion, it is clear that no representation which the stockholder
may have made can be deemed to be a term or condition of the con-
tract between the creditor and the corporation. Estoppel must
stand on the same basis as common law fraud; if there is no repre-
sentation and no reliance, there can be no estoppel or fraud. If Mr-
Pollock is right, therefore, the present case furnishes no ground on
which a court of equity can compel the supposed representations
to be made good.
Of course, an exceptional case may aiise where a creditor can
show fraud or make out an estoppel. But such is not the ordinary
case. To relieve the creditor, who best knows whether he has been
misled or not, from the necessity of making any proof at all is an in-
tolerable hardship on the stockholder.
The term fraud is used in courts of equity very freely and in
many kinds of cases, but so far as the writer has been able to dis-
cover, none of those cases furnish any ground for a recovery in
such a case as that under discussion.
The necessary conclusion is that there is no principle of law or
equity on which a creditor of a corporation can compel a stockholder
to pay more for his stock that he has agreed to pay. If such a
result is to be brought about, it must be by virtue of some statutory
regulation. Such is the conclusion of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in the case of Christensen v. Eno (io6 N. Y. 97) which holds
that a stockholder's liability arises from contract or statu.te; that
unissued stock is not assets and that a person accepting shares as a
gratuity has not injured the creditors or incurred a liability to
pay the par value, contrary to his agreement, unless by reason of
some statute.
Such also is the law of England where the courts hold not that
such a stockholder incurs a common law liability, but that there is
a statutory obligation on the one accepting a share of stock which
cannot be varied by contract.
Ooregum Gold Min. Co. v. Roper (1892, H. L. App. Cas. 125).
This obligation may be inforced not merely by creditors but
by the other shareholders.
Welton v. Saffery, L. R. H. L. 305 (1897).
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The case of Ncw Haven Trust Co. v. Gaffucy, 73 Conn. 480, is
to be sustained on this ground if at all. There the only agreement
of the defendant was to pay 65 per cent. of the par value of the
stock. In view of this express agreement, no other agreement can
be "implied," or in other words inferred from the fact of acceptance
of a certificate. The court is, therefore, mistaken when it says
"The defendant, by taking the shares in question became, under his
contract of inembership, liable to pay $ioo" for each share.
The court also says that any contract by the company to issue
shares at less than par was ultra vires. Unless the statute imposes
on the one accepting a certificate of stock an obligation to pay par,
the fact that the agreement to issue stock for less that par was ultra
vires, instead of making the stockholder liable to pay par would
relieve him from any liability at all. If the corporation is not bound
by its contract because of lack of power to make it, the other party
cannot be bound. The contract should be rescinded and the pur-
chaser restored to his former position. It was so held in Peter v.
Union Mfg. Co. (56 Ohio St. 18I).
See also Scoille v. Thayer (105 U. S. 143).
But, if the effect of the statute is to impose a statutory obliga-
tion on the one accepting a stock certificate, then the case is in line
with the English decisions and the corporation would have no power
to vary the obligation. To release the stockholder from it would
amount to giving away the assets of the company to the detriment of
the other stockholders and in fraud of creditors. If the statute
will bear such a construction, the case was correctly decided.
The liability of stockholders beyond their agreements, according
to this view, becomes a matter for statutory regulation. It is the
legislature that relieves stockholders from liability and it is for
the legislature likewise to determine how far public policy requires
that they should continue liable, apart from their actual agreements
or frauds. There may be many valid grounds of public policy why
par should be paid for every share of stock. In the view of the
writer, however, the protection of creditors against the issue of
watered or fictitious stock is not one of them, for such issue is no in-
jury to corporate creditors.
Ed-in S. Hunt.
Waterbury, Conn., Oct., 19o2.
